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A
GUINDA V. CHEVRONTEXACO, CURRENTLY BEING HEARD
in the Superior Court of Sucumbios in the Ecuadorian
Amazon, has the potential to set a precedent that could
benefit millions of persons victimized by human rights
abuses committed by multinational corporations pursuing economic
gain. Initiated by solo practitioner Cristobal Bonifaz in 1993, co-
counseled by a Philadelphia-based law firm known for innovative
human rights cases, and driven by eighty affected communities in the
Amazon region, this litigation represents the first time in Latin
America and possibly in the developing world where a historically
marginalized class of persons has established legal jurisdiction over a
multinational oil company in a case involving billions of dollars of
environmental damages. This case is also a leading example of how
courts have the potential to re-allocate some of the costs of global-
ization—in this case, environmental destruction—from the most
vulnerable rainforest dwellers to the most powerful energy compa-
nies on the planet.
The goal of the case is to remedy the worst oil-related ecological
catastrophe in the world, and according to some experts, the worst
ecological catastrophe of any kind next to Chernobyl. Until recently,
this disaster was largely hidden from public view, even though it has
festered for three decades and has been connected to hundreds of can-
cer-related deaths and the devastation of five indigenous cultures.
A distinguishing feature of the litigation is that any judgment
imposed in Ecuador is enforceable against ChevronTexaco’s assets in
the U.S. via the District Court of New York, where the case was orig-
inally filed. This multi-jurisdictional arrangement means that Aguinda
v. ChevronTexaco could provide signposts for a new model of class-
action environmental litigation using Southern court systems against
Northern multinationals. To what extent a new litigation model
emerges from this case, and whether that model is worth emulating
given the extraordinary level of suffering that has accrued over the
many years of legal battles and delays, remains to be seen. 
BACKGROUND
AGUINDA V. CHEVRONTEXACO AROSE OUT OF THE HAZARDOUS
methods of oil extraction Texaco used when it became the first oil
company to enter Ecuador’s Amazon region in the late 1960s
(Chevron and Texaco merged in 2001, and the combined entity is
called ChevronTexaco). Ecuador’s Ministry of Energy and Mines
entered into a partnership with Texaco to develop fields in the north-
ern part of the Amazon region just south of Colombia. Its contract
required it to take all reasonable measures to protect the environment,
and government officials at the time testified that they expected the
methods to be consistent with the best practices then used in the
United States and most other countries. These requirements, largely
ignored by Texaco in Ecuador, were intended to protect what was con-
sidered one of the most fragile ecosystems in the world, home to five
percent of the plant species on the planet and five of the nine indige-
nous groups in Ecuador’s Amazon region—the Cofan, Secoya, Siona,
Huaorani, and Quichua. 
The fundamental claim of the lawsuit is that Texaco, to save an
estimated $3 per barrel or $4.5 billion over the two decades of the
operations, systematically dumped billions of gallons of toxic waste
into unlined pits dug out of the earth and into swamps, streams, and
rivers. When oil is extracted from a well, it produces two fundamen-
tal parts. One is the commercially marketable crude and the other is
“water of formation” that includes carcinogenic toxins such as ben-
zene, toluene, and arsenic. To minimize impact on the environment
and surrounding populations, it has been the custom of the oil indus-
try for at least one-half century to separate the water of formation
from the marketable crude and dispose of it by “re-injecting” it back
into wells, sometimes as deep as thousands of feet underground.
Properly re-injected, these powerful toxins have little or no environ-
mental impact. Not to re-inject has been considered extremely haz-
ardous. For example, the state of Texas outlawed the practice of dump-
ing water of formation in 1919. 
Significantly, most of the pollution alleged in the complaint was
not caused by pipeline spills or a calamitous one-time spill, as was the
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case with the Exxon Valdez. Rather, the damage was the result of a
conscious decision by Texaco executives to increase its return by exter-
nalizing to the environment the cost of disposing the water of forma-
tion on a daily basis at all of its 330 well sites. At the height of its oper-
ation, Texaco dumped 4.3 million gallons of water of formation per
day into the rainforest.
Once a pristine rainforest, the area where Texaco operated is now
filled with 627 open-air, toxic waste pits and hundreds of swamps and
streams filled with fudge-like oil muck. Some of the waste pits are the
size of football fields, and many contain the carcasses of cows and
horses that have fallen in the pits and asphyxiated. Over the years, the
contents of each pit have leeched into the groundwater and surround-
ing streams and rivers, which the population depends on for drinking
water. Because there is virtually no running water in the region and
bottled water is not affordable nor available, the vast majority of peo-
ple who live in the countryside are forced to slowly poison themselves
day after day when they consume the contaminated water. 
Two epidemiological studies found that rates of cancer and other
diseases are skyrocketing in the areas that are most affected. It is com-
mon to meet young women who complain of spontaneous abortions
and/or uterine cancer, or who have young children who have died of
cancer. Studies indicate that most natural water sources are contami-
nated at hundreds or even thousands of times levels considered safe by
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency or the European Union.
For the clean up, an oil remediation expert hired by the plaintiffs esti-
mated it will take a minimum of $6.14 billion and at least five to ten
years of around-the-clock dredging, incineration, and disposal. While
this might seem like a large sum, it is a relatively modest portion of the
estimated $20 to $30 billion in profits that Texaco extracted from its
operations in Ecuador. 
Before Texaco arrived, the five indigenous groups in this area had
prospered for centuries by living off the forest and river ecosystems.
Each of these groups has been severely impacted, and one group, the
Cofan, has seen its population drop from 15,000 in 1970 to approxi-
mately 800 today. Residents of the region are exposed to contaminants
and suffer dreadful medical consequences and the added indignity of
having their survival as a cultural entity threatened. 
CREATING A LEGAL CASE
FILING AN ORIGINAL ACTION IN ECUADOR UNDER ECUADORIAN
law seemed far-fetched. Courts in Ecuador had virtually no history of
hearing environmental cases against multinational oil companies, and
the largest judgment against an oil company after more than twenty
years of oil activity and millions of gallons of spills and dumping was
less than $1,000. The Ecuadorian judiciary was hostage to an anti-
quated civil code (e.g., no pre-trial discovery, no right of the parties to
call their own experts, and no cross-examination of witnesses) and had
a reputation for corruption such that the plaintiffs had no confidence
in their national court system even if the civil code was not so bur-
dened. Further, because there was no mechanism for a class action,
each of the tens of thousands of victims would have to sue individual-
ly in the local court where the damage occurred. This was a practical
impossibility, as there are only four judges and a handful of lawyers in
the region and the vast majority of those affected had no money to
finance a lawsuit. For these reasons, the U.S.-based legal team con-
cluded that Ecuador’s civil justice system simply could not provide an
adequate remedy against Texaco.
The most logical place to file, then, was the federal court in New
York City. At the time, this option made the most sense because it
seemed like a far more convenient forum than Ecuador. Texaco’s glob-
al headquarters was only thirty kilometers away from the Manhattan
courthouse, in the New York City suburb of White Plains. Most wit-
nesses, including those from Texaco and any experts, would speak
English and be in the United States. A U.S. court, even though his-
torically loath to take cases against American companies from foreign
plaintiffs, was the most likely place to get a fair hearing if jurisdiction
could be established. Civil procedure law in the U.S. also provided a
mechanism for class-actions, meaning thousands of victims could join
together in one lawsuit represented by one legal team. The case could
be decided by a jury of American citizens, as opposed to a judge.
Finally, a U.S. court would have the power to enforce a judgment
against Texaco in the U.S., where its assets lay. 
FILING A CLAIM IN U.S. COURTS
The case was brought under traditional common-law tort theo-
ries of negligence, public nuisance, private nuisance, strict liability,
trespass, and civil conspiracy. Additionally, the litigation team alleged
a violation of the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). This law, passed by
the first U.S. Congress in 1789, allows federal courts original jurisdic-
tion over any civil action brought by a foreigner for torts committed
in violation of the law of nations. In sum, there seemed to be ample
basis for jurisdiction in the U.S. apart from the ATCA, while at the
same time the ATCA provided its own base of jurisdiction independ-
ent of the other common-law theories.
Egregious environmental damage of this sort did not at first
glance present a convincing case for a violation of the law of nations,
given the nascent state of international law on the environment at the
time the case was filed. Texaco’s actions seemed more like the byprod-
uct of an attempt to maximize profits, rather than an overtly political
crime more likely to be litigated under international law. Thus, an
action in the U.S. based only on the ATCA seemed risky. Even though
the ATCA has been used successfully against foreign government offi-
cials accused of political crimes such as torture, it had never been used
successfully to prosecute a private company for the destructive envi-
ronmental impact of its economic activity. 
In regard to the ATCA, the limited question before the court was
whether Texaco’s adoption of sub-standard exploration methods in
Ecuador violated the law of nations. This question was explored in
three separate, yet interrelated, ways: first, was the environmental
harm such that it violated customary international law; second, did
the impact on the indigenous groups amount to cultural genocide;
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and third, did the methods used by Texaco amount to a form of racial
or ethnic discrimination, given that they only dumped water of for-
mation in communities inhabited by indigenous persons and persons
of color. Legal papers cited various declarations, treaties, and com-
mentaries of international jurists in support of these arguments
(including the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment,
the Convention On Biological Diversity, the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development [Rio Declaration], the Protocol of
1984 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage, the U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, as well as support among commentators for a
basic international norm prohibiting serious assaults on the environ-
ment). In short, the plaintiffs argued that the survival of the indige-
nous groups in Ecuador—as well as the human race—depended to
some extent on the survival of the rainforest that Texaco was destroy-
ing with its methods of oil extraction, and that Texaco’s behavior vio-
lated the law of nations just like piracy on the high seas or state-man-
dated torture. 
The lawyers never regarded this action exclusively or even pre-
dominately as an ATCA case. It was always primarily a tort action with
underlying human rights claims framed through traditional common-
law theories. Cultural genocide and environmental harm could be lit-
igated not only through the ATCA but just as effectively through the-
ories of negligence, strict liability, trespass, and nuisance. This
approach not only had a solid basis in law, but given the novelty of the
ATCA in the environmental context, the litigation team decided it
would be more palatable to a court historically suspect of granting
jurisdiction to low-income foreign plaintiffs suing a wealthy American
corporation.
The initial decision in 1994 on Texaco’s motion to dismiss the
case was extremely encouraging. Judge Vincent Broderick, in granting
discovery rights to the plaintiffs, found that the Rio Declaration was
supportive of allegations that the widespread dumping of hazardous
wastes violated the law of nations. Judge Broderick passed away in
1995 and was replaced by Judge Jed Rakoff, who suggested that the
ATCA was not violated and ruled the case should be heard in Ecuador
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens (which allows a case to be
“removed”—not dismissed—when the judge determines that another
forum is more convenient and could provide an adequate remedy to
the plaintiffs). However, the court forced Texaco to make several con-
cessions. The company had to stipulate that it would accept jurisdic-
tion in Ecuador. It also had to agree that thousands of pages of its
internal documents received via discovery in the U.S. could be used as
proof in the Ecuadorian litigation. Finally, Texaco had to waive defens-
es under Ecuadorian law based on the statute of limitations and agree
to pay any judgment imposed against it. In short, if ChevronTexaco
wanted to avoid judgment in the U.S., it had to agree to engage in a
trial in Ecuador under conditions the likes of which had never been
seen in Latin America and which could scarcely have been contem-
plated at the outset of the litigation.
REMOVAL TO ECUADORIAN COURTS
On August 16, 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the “removal” of the case to Ecuador after almost ten
years of litigation. At that point, a pivotal decision had to be made:
would it be worth it to go through the major expense and logistical
challenge of re-filing the case in Ecuador? The answer, for reasons
related to conditions imposed on ChevronTexaco by the U.S. Court
of Appeals, but also to improvements in the Ecuadorian civil justice
system during the decade of the litigation, was a resounding yes. In
effect, the only alternative was to let the case end, which would have
guaranteed that there would be no legal remedy. But to continue a case
in a foreign forum after removal from the U.S. on grounds of forum
non conveniens would be rare. Because of the expense and difficulties
in finding local counsel, the overwhelming majority of such cases
never get re-filed. Moreover, because it still was not possible to bring
a class-action case in Ecuador, the only viable way to frame the case
was as a “popular action” brought by an organization that would seek
clean-up. Given the shortcomings of the Ecuadorian civil code, it
would not be practicable to seek personal damages. Thus, the thou-
sands of victims would not recover personal compensation unless it
could be negotiated with the company after a judgment was imposed
by the court. 
On October 21, 2003, when Judge Alberto Guerra Bastides
called the court to order in the town of Lago Agrio, more than sixty
of the victims—many indigenous in traditional dress—packed the
gallery. About 1,000 more plaintiffs and townspeople stood on the
street outside the courthouse. Some, like the Huaorani, traveled two
days by foot, canoe, and bus to attend the trial. Dozens of photogra-
phers and television crews, from Ecuador and around the world, were
on hand. The local radio station broadcast the proceedings live.
Lawyers from ChevronTexaco, including a vice-president based in the
U.S., were present. In Ecuador, the trial led national broadcasts and
made the front pages of every leading newspaper in the country—one
called it “The Environmental Trial of the Century.”
Over the course of the initial six-day “proof period” called for by
Ecuadorian law, the plaintiffs submitted 6,000 pages of documentary
evidence and presented several witnesses, including a Spanish doctor
who conducted the epidemiological studies, a former Ecuadorian mil-
itary leader who was the minister of energy in the 1970s, and several
local residents affected by the contamination. In addition, an expert
hired by the plaintiffs released a preliminary assessment in which he
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concluded that a comprehensive clean-up would cost at least $6.14
billion, a figure almost as large as the government’s annual budget and
about one-third the size of the national debt. In February 2004, the
second phase of the trial is set to begin. This involves site inspections
by the judge, field testimony of witnesses who live near the toxic waste
pits, and reports by court-appointed scientific experts. The inspections
are expected to take approximately six months, with a decision expect-
ed in late 2004. Any decision can be appealed to an intermediate court
in the region, and then to the country’s Supreme Court in Quito.
ChevronTexaco presented no witnesses or documentary evidence
during the initial period, and instead relied on two technical defenses.
First, it claimed the plaintiffs sued the wrong party. It claimed that the
proper defendant was not ChevronTexaco but rather its fourth-tier,
wholly-owned subsidiary, Texpet,
or Texaco itself rather than
ChevronTexaco. Given this claim
that the proper party was not
sued, ChevronTexaco challenged
the jurisdiction of the court to
hear the case despite its stipula-
tion with the federal U.S. court
that it would accept jurisdiction
in Ecuador. Judge Guerra imme-
diately rejected this jurisdictional
challenge. Second, ChevronTexa-
co claimed that the Ecuadorian
government released it from all
responsibility for clean-up follow-
ing a $40 million settlement with
Ecuador’s Ministry of Energy and
Mines in 1995. The plaintiffs
have challenged this agreement as
fraudulent and argue that regard-
less it is irrelevant to the private
claims of Ecuador’s citizens who
live in the region. As part of this agreement, Texaco claimed it reme-
diated 207 of the 627 waste pits it left behind, but a study by the
plaintiffs submitted as evidence found that each of these pits still con-
tained significant concentrations of oil and toxins underneath dirt that
was piled on top of the sludge. Significantly, as part of this agreement,
ChevronTexaco never claimed to have remediated the contaminated
groundwater, or the swamps and rivers into which the water of for-
mation leeched or was dumped directly. According to the plaintiffs’
expert, these components of the clean-up comprise the bulk of the
multi-billion dollar cost estimate for a comprehensive remediation. 
CONCLUSION
ONE OF THE IRONIES OF THE CASE IS THAT AFTER ARGUING for
ten years before a U.S. court that the case should be heard in Ecuador,
ChevronTexaco promptly challenged the Ecuadorian court’s jurisdic-
tion. And after arguing for ten years that Ecuador could not possibly
provide a fair forum for the case, the plaintiffs embraced the opportu-
nity to use that country’s forum despite its procedural limitations and
its history of failing to act on environmental claims. ChevronTexaco’s
defense might be an example of assertive lawyering, but much of the
Ecuadorian press interpreted its challenge to the court’s jurisdiction as
an affront to Ecuador’s sovereignty. As for the plaintiffs, the federal
U.S. court’s exercise of residual jurisdiction over ChevronTexaco in
Ecuador provided powerful leverage that would not have existed had
the case been filed in Ecuador initially. Further, the lead Ecuadorian
lawyer for the plaintiffs, Alberto Wray, is a former member of the
Ecuadorian Supreme Court and a leader in efforts to reform the
nation’s judiciary to make it less corrupt and more procedurally agile.
Wray is highly respected in Ecuador and throughout Latin America
and, working closely with his colleague Monica Pareja, he is confident
that the case can get a fair hearing in Ecuador despite the doubts of
some of the plaintiffs.
If one can make out a new model of litigation for environmen-
tal problems in the developing world based on this case, such model
might have certain elements. Initiating the case in the U.S. provided
the means to subject Chevron-
Texaco to jurisdiction in
Ecuador, the tools (via the inter-
nal documents obtained through
discovery) to prove the case, and
the enforcement power to ensure
payment of any judgment that
might be imposed. Also impor-
tant is transnational cooperation
among lawyers and clients. The
solo practitioner who initiated
the case, Cristobal Bonifaz, is an
Ecuadorian native who bridges
cultural gaps between the U.S.
lawyers and Ecuadorian lawyers
and clients. The U.S. law firm of
Kohn, Swift & Graf, which spe-
cializes in class-action litigation
with human rights implications,
has provided legal expertise and
financial resources to sustain
what for years was an inordi-
nately high-risk litigation (the lawyers are working on a contingency-
fee basis, meaning no fees will be collected if the plaintiffs do not pre-
vail).  Manuel Pallares, a highly skilled biologist from Quito who has
lived in the Amazon region, has been instrumental in locating and
identifying each of Texaco’s toxic pits (amazingly, there is no evidence
the company kept records of each pit it left behind).  Perhaps most
importantly, the class of plaintiffs in the 80 affected communities has
been united in a grass roots organization called the Front for the
Defense of the Amazon. This organization and its leader, Luis Yanza,
have played  an indispensable role in driving the litigation, capturing
the public imagination in Ecuador, and providing consistent direction
to lawyers in the U.S.
Ultimately, the case is about whether the life of people in the
rainforest is worth as much to a multinational company as the life of
a person in the developed world, where oil companies use re-injection
technology. If ChevronTexaco can be held accountable for its actions
in Ecuador, there will exist a new economic incentive for all oil com-
panies to raise the standards of their practices throughout the devel-
oping world. In Ecuador, as a result of this litigation and the potential
multi-billion dollar liability facing the company, those standards are
already rising.  HRB
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